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A reassessment of E.H. Carr and the realist tradition: Britain, German-
Soviet Relations and neoclassical realism 
Keith Smith, University of Strathclyde 
Abstract 
(+ &DUU¶V connection to realism has increasingly been called into question. Revisionist 
OLWHUDWXUHKDVSRLQWHG WR UHDOLVP¶VQDUURZXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI&DUU DQGGUDZQ IURPKLVZLGHU
ERG\ RI ZRUN LQ RUGHU WR SUREOHPDWL]H &DUU¶V DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK UHDOLVP *LYHQ WKDW LW
overlooks two key texts produced by Carr, the revisionist literature is incomplete. Refocusing 
on Britain and German-Soviet Relations, especially the way in which they reflect ideas 
associated with the realist tradition, this paper demonstrates the continued traditional link 
betwHHQ&DUUDQGUHDOLVP+DYLQJGRQHVRLWFRQVLGHUVWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\UHOHYDQFHRI&DUU¶V
lesser known realist work. Drawing parallels between Britain and German-Soviet Relations 
DQG QHRFODVVLFDO UHDOLVP WKH SDSHU FRQWHQGV WKDW &DUU¶V IRUJRWWHQ WH[WV FDQ VHrve as the 
foundation for a more classically orientated, European mode of neoclassical realism. 
Introduction 
For at least the last two decades, International Relations (IR) has undertaken what has been 
termed a historiographical turn (Bell, 2001). The reasons for this are relatively 
straightforward and documented elsewhere: following the end of the Cold War, if not before, 
WKHGLVFLSOLQH¶VKHJHPRQLFWUXWKVEHFDPHLQFUHDVLQJO\contested. Much of the work here has 
focused on destabilising our traditional understanding of the first great debate (e.g. Schmidt, 
2012) in addition to presenting a more accurate and refined understanding of canonical, 
typically realist thinkers (e.g. Williams, 2007; Bell, 2009). In terms of the latter, much work 
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has offered a more nuanced understanding of classical realist authors, seeking to challenge 
UHDOLVP¶VFRORQLVDWLRQRIWKHVHWH[WVDQGGUDZSDUDOOHOVZLWKFRQWHPSRUDU\FULWLFDODSSURDFKHV
(e.g. Behr and Molloy, 2013). 
Aligned with this trend, a more specific literature has questioned the typical 
disciplinary understanding of E.H. Carr. This focus is understandable as E.H. Carr broadly 
and 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV specifically (whether or not intentionally) played a pivotal role 
LQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHGLVFLSOLQH¶VKLVWRULFDOQarrative (Dunne et al, 1998). The revisionist 
literature, which will be discussed below, has increasingly questioned the orthodox depiction 
of Carr and his most (in)famous text by drawing attention to the texts produced by Carr in the 
interwar and postwar era. This literature is more incomplete than inaccurate, however, 
because it overlooks two texts, Britain and German-Soviet Relations, which were written by 
&DUU LQ WKH VDPH SHULRG 8WLOLVLQJ +DVODP¶V  tour de horizon of realist thought, this 
paper makes the case that a more authentic realism can be found in these overlooked texts. 
The analysis is subsequently extended by illustrating points of convergence and divergence 
between these lost texts and contemporary realist approaches, specifically neoclassical 
realism. 
7KHGLVFXVVLRQEHORZGUDZVIURP6WHHOH¶VSS±743) double movement of 
restoration and contemporary reconstruction. The former entails trying to restore a classical 
text as one would attempt (as much as is possible) to restore a building to its original form. 
The latter, in contrast, involves teasing out the implications of a classical text and bringing 
them to bear on contemporary scholarly debates. The paper begins by sketching out the 
revisionist turn and the manner in which it has reshaped our understanding of Carr broadly 
and 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV specifically. ,PSRUWDQWO\ WKH UHYLVLRQLVW OLWHUDWXUH¶V
incompleteness ± its oversight of Britain and German-Soviet Relations ± is highlighted. This 
necessitates the second section, which, using a number of realist principles as focal points, 
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restores Britain and German-Soviet Relations to the realist tradition. The third section then 
SRQGHUVRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&DUU¶VORVWZRUNDQGQHRFODVVLFDOUHDOLVP,WDUJXHVWKDW
Britain and German-Soviet Relations can exploit the transatlantic divide in terms of 
contemporary neoclassical realist work and serve as the foundation for a more classically 
orientated, European mode of neoclassical realism. 
Revisionism and 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶Crisis 
Revisionist historiography is concerned with challenging taken-for-granted truths and 
FRQYHQWLRQV $VKZRUWK  S  ,W HQWDLOV GLJJLQJ µGHHSHU LQWR WKH KLVWRU\ >RI ,5@¶
which ultimately involves painting µD SLFWXUH WKDW LV IDU PRUH WH[WXUHG much more 
complicated, and altogether interesting, than the one we normally present to our first year 
VWXGHQWV¶ &R[  S [LY ,Q WHUPV RI &DUU DQG 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV, this entails 
questioning his relationship to realism. Historically and convHQWLRQDOO\&DUU¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWR
realism has been affirmed. Thomson (1980) DV DQ H[DPSOH ZULWHV WKDW &DUU ODLG µWKH
IRXQGDWLRQVIRUSROLWLFDOUHDOLVP¶ (p. 69). Contemporary scholars reproduce this idea. As an 
example, Mearsheimer (2005) QRWHVWKDW&DUU¶s attack on utopian intellectualism earned Carr 
µKLVUHDOLVWVSXUV¶(p. 141). Revisionists question this understanding. Generally, the revisionist 
view can be distilled to two points: first, 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV in particular has been 
misunderstood at the very least or, more nefariously, misrepresented; and second, Carr more 
widely has been mischaracterised because the traditional view has tended to reduce his 
contribution to 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV instead of appreciating the breadth and depth of his 
writings on international affairs. 
To take the latter point first, Wilson (2001) writes of a typically held view in the field 
WKDW µ&DUU¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQVEHJLQV DQGHQGVZLWK 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶
Crisis¶ZKLFKLVDYLHZWKDW:LOVRQWHUPVµGDPDJLQJ«QRWRQO\IRURXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKLV
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thought as a whole, but also our understanding of [7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV@LWVHOI¶ (p. 125). 
Johnston (1967) and Evans (1975) were the first to broaden the typically held narrow view by 
disagreeing oveU WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK &DUU¶V H[SODQDWLRQ IRU WKH EUHDNGRZQ RI RUGHU ZDV
congruent across 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV, Conditions of Peace and Nationalism and After. 
Howe (1994) followed suit by pointing to the evident critical edge underpinning these three 
texts. Subsequently Linklater (1997) showed the importance of a more expansive 
understanding of citizenship buttressing 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV and Nationalism and After 
specifically. More extensive monographs followed by Jones (1998) and Haslam (2000) in 
which biographical details often overlooked ZHUH JLYHQ IXOOHU FRQVLGHUDWLRQ &R[¶V 
edited collection, which included contributions from specialists in IR, history and 
6RYLHWRORJ\HTXDOO\VHUYHGDVDUHPLQGHUWKDW&DUU¶VWKRXJKWZDVPRUHH[WHQVLYHDQd indeed 
more interesting than the traditional view gave him credit for. And, more recently, work has 
VRXJKWWRUHFRYHU&DUU¶VURPDQWLFELRJUDSKLFDOSHULRG1LVKLPXUDFRQVLGHUWKHHWKLFDO
positions underlying his work (Molloy, 2013), reconsider CarU¶VKLVWRULFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
the state (Kostagiannis, 2013) and stress the influence of Frankfurt critical theory on The 
7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV and What is History (Babík, 2013). Gone, in other words, is the 
traditional depiction of Carr; in its place is a more plural understanding, which is best 
FDSWXUHG LQ :LOVRQ¶V  GHSLFWLRQ RI &DUU DV D µ³sort-of-
Realist/Functionalist/Keynesian/Marxist-influenced/Proto-IR-&ULWLFDO7KHRULVW´¶S. 
7KHEURDGHQLQJRIRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI&DUU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ WR IR has enhanced our 
understanding of his most (in)famous text, 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV. In turn, the depiction of 
it as realism par excellence has been undermined. Booth (1991), as an example, concludes 
that the traditional depiction of it as an attack RQ XWRSLDQLVP µIDLOHG WR QRWH >&DUU¶V@
XQFHUWDLQW\KLV FULWLFLVPRI UHDOLVPDQGKLVSRVLWLYHFRPPHQWVDERXWXWRSLDQLVP¶ (p. 531). 
Likewise, Jones (1998) observes that familiarity with Carr and 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV µKDV
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gone hand in hand with deep confXVLRQ DERXW WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI KLV ZRUN¶ (p. 3). More 
VFDWKLQJO\ SHUKDSV &R[ LQ KLV SUHIDFH WR WKH WH[W¶V reissue suggests that its meaning was 
purposefully bent out of shape in order to legitimise a particular way of thinking about 
international affairs at the onset of the Cold War. In turn, it definitely came close to becoming 
µWKHOHDVWXQGHUVWRRGERRNLQWKHKLVWRU\RILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV¶&DUUS xiii). 
:KHWKHUWKHWH[W¶VPHDQLQJZDVPLVFRQVWUXHGRUPDQLSXODWHGLVQRWWKHFRQFHUQKHUH 
:KDW LV FOHDU KRZHYHU LV WKDW WKH WH[W¶V SURJUHVVLYH aspects make its relationship to the 
UHDOLVWWUDGLWLRQSUREOHPDWLF:LOVRQGHILQHVSURJUHVVLYHFKDQJHDVWKHµEHOLHIWKDWWKH
world does not have to look the way that it does, and that through reason, courage, 
LPDJLQDWLRQDQGGHWHUPLQDWLRQLWLVSRVVLEOHWRDUULYHDWDEHWWHUZD\RIEHLQJDQGOLYLQJ¶S
 ,Q FRQWUDVW WR WKLV KRSHIXO RXWORRN UHDOLVWV µFDQ JHQHUDOO\ EH FRXQWHG RQ WR WDNH D
SHVVLPLVWLFRU³$XJXVWLQLDQ´YLHZRIWKHEHKDYLRXURf man or society or both in the conduct 
RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV¶ +DVODP  S  ,W LV WKH IRUPHU HOHPHQWV DV RWKHUV KDYH
pointed out, which have been downplayed in the conventional understanding of Carr (Booth, 
1991; Howe, 1994; Linklater, 1997). 
0RUHRYHUWKHFRQYHQWLRQDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHWH[WKDVW\SLFDOO\IRFXVHGRQ&DUU¶V
attack on the utopian tendency of neglecting of power (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 140). This has 
helped conceal his attack on realism as determinism. Take the very first paragraph of the first 
HGLWLRQ¶VSUHIDFHDVDQH[DPSOH$FFRUGLQJWR&DUULWZDVµZULWWHQDWDWLPHZKHQZDU
was already casting its shadow on the world, but when all hope of averting it was not yet lost¶
(p. ix, my emphasis). The criticism that Carr (1946, p. 10, 89±94) makes of realism, which 
has often been overlooked by realists, was in actuality a critique of determinism. In this 
respect, as Carr (1936) did elsewhere, he was in actuality arguing, in part, that war with 
Germany could be averted ± it was not inevitable. The purpose here is not to launch an attack 
on Carr, however easy that with the benefit of hindsight may be (Fox, 1985). Rather the 
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purpose here is to recognise that, to reflect on 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV in terms of 
contemporary scholarship, there is a lot more Ikenberry (2008) than Mearsheimer (2010) in 
WKHWH[WQRWGLVFRXQWLQJWKHWH[W¶VPRUHUDGLFDO0DU[LVWXQGHUWRQHVDQGLWVDWWDFNRQDEVWUDFW
liberal internationalism) (Cox, 1999, 2010). 
After taking on board the revisionist literature on Carr, where does that leave us in 
terms of our understanding of 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV DQG&DUU¶VWKRXJKWDVDZKROH"0RUH
importantly, why call Carr a realist after all these (revisionist) years? After all, Jones (1998) 
observes that, although µKHHOXGHVHDV\WH[WERRNFODVVLILFDWLRQ¶&DUU µZDVDUHDOLVWRIVRPH
NLQG RU RWKHU¶ (p. 144) &R[ FRQFOXGHV WKDW &DUU ZDV D UHDOLVW LI RI µD YHU\ GLIIHUHQW VRUW¶
(Carr, 2001, p. xl); and Haslam (2002), perhaps in a less guarded moment, suggests that Carr 
was not dissatisfied with his machtpolitik LPDJHµEHFDXVHKHUHFRJQLVHGWKHLPDJHWREHQRW
DOWRJHWKHULQDFFXUDWH¶ (p. 200). In the next section I begin to unpack the ideas found in two 
texts, often overlooked by both realists and revisionists, which offeUDFOXHDVWRZK\&DUU¶V
connection with realism is not only apt but is in fact even stronger given contemporary 
developments in the realist tradition.  
Restoration: Britain, German-Soviet Relations and the realist tradition 
I am referring here specifically to two texts produced by Carr on British, German and Soviet 
interwar diplomacy. Britain (1939) offered an explanation for British interwar policy that was 
sympathetic to both international (relative decline) and domestic (partisan politics) 
conditions. German-Soviet Relations (1951) outlined how these two nations were compelled 
by international conditions to seek a rapprochement during the interregnum, but significant 
DWWHQWLRQ ZDV SDLG WR SLYRWDO LQGLYLGXDOV VXFK DV *XVWDY 6WUHVHPDQQ *HUPDQ\¶V )RUHLJQ
Minister throughout most of the 1920s, and Karl Radek, who amongst other things helped 
negotiate the Brest-Litovsk treaty and, from a prison cell, helped re-establish diplomatic links 
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between the Soviet Union and Germany. The combined focus on both international factors 
(relative power) and domestic or unit-level factors (individuals and party politics) mean that 
these texts should, at the very least, be of interest to neoclassical realists. Indeed, in the third 
section of this paper I will make the case that this theoretical development in the realist 
OLWHUDWXUH PDNHV &DUU¶V DW OHDVW WKH &DUU WKDW ZURWH Britain and German-Soviet Relations) 
connection to realism more evident. Unfortunately, UHDOLVWV EURDGO\ WHQG WR UHGXFH &DUU¶V
contribution to The Twenty YHDUV¶&ULVLV, meaning that Britain and German-Soviet Relations 
have effectively been lost by realists (this point will be developed further in the subsequent 
section). The revisionist literature is also limited here in certain respects as the focus is 
LQVWHDGRQRWKHUWH[WVLQ&DUU¶VFRUSXVLHConditions of Peace, Nationalism and After and 
What is History).1 ,ILWLVWUXHWKDWZHPXVWDSSUHFLDWH&DUU¶VZRUNDVDZKROHWRXQGHUVWDQG
his political thought in toto (Wilson, 2001, p. 125), then this oversight is in need of 
correction. 
To do so, it is first necessary to outline what is actually meant by realism. Typically, 
this is normally addressed by outlining some core theoretical assumptions e.g. state-centrism, 
the pervasiveness of anarchy and the centrality of power (Walt, 1997, p. 932). The problem 
with such theoreWLFDO FRQVWUXFWV KRZHYHU LV WKDW WKH\ WHQG WR LPSRVH µXSRQ D ORRVH DQG
fragmented assemblage of thought a degree of coherence which is arguably unjustified and 
XQQHFHVVDU\¶ +DVODP  S  5DWKHU WKDQ WKLQNLQJ DERXW UHDOLVP LQ WHUPV RI LWV
theoretical assumptions, therefore, it is perhaps wiser to think about realism in terms of 
tradition. Traditions of thought are webs of beliefs and ideas which political thinkers inherit. 
They are, as Sterling-)RONHUQRWHVµLPDJLQHGFRPPXQLWLHVRIWKRXJKt that provide a 
ODEHODQGKLVWRU\IRUEHOLHIVDQGSUDFWLFHV¶S)ROORZLQJ+DVODPLWLVSRVVLEOHWR
conceive of the realist tradition in terms of four beliefs/ideas: raison d'état; the balance of 
power; the balance of trade; and geopolitics.2 
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The restoration of Britain and German-Soviet Relations will follow shortly, and at the 
VDPH WLPH LW ZLOO GUDZ IURP +DVODP¶V EHOLHIVLGHDV WR GHPRQVWUDWH WKH OLQNDJHV EHWZHHQ
&DUU¶VIRUJRWWHQWH[WVDQGWKHUHDOLVWWUDGLWLRQ)LUVWKRZHYHU,VKDOODWWHPSt to pre-empt the 
FULWLFLVPWKDWPD\EHUDLVHGVKRXOGRQHIROORZWKLV³NH\FRQFHSWV´DSSURDFK+DOODQG%HYLU
(2014) contend that as traditions of thought are inherited and, equally importantly, that 
WKLQNHUV KDYH DJHQF\ WR µQXUWXUH VTXDQGHU EXLOG XSRQ RU HYHQ UHMHFW¶ WUDGLWLRQV WKHQ
WUDGLWLRQVFDQQRWEHWKRXJKWRIDVµKDYLQJ³IL[HGFRUHV´¶S&RUHLGHDVLQRWKHUZRUGV
rise and fall in importance in term of the thinker/scholar and the context they inhabit. This 
view is repeated by Sterling-FolkHU  ZKR DUJXHV WKDW WUDGLWLRQV µKDYH QR REMHFWLYH
QDWXUDO FRUH WKDW GHWHUPLQHV ZKDW IDOOV LQ DQG RXWVLGH RI WKHLU GRPDLQV¶ LQVWHDG WKH\ DUH
µQDWXUDOO\ LQFRKHUHQW DQG GHSHQG RQ FUHDWLYH VKLIWLQJ FKDQJLQJ DQG DGDSWLYH DFWV RI ZLOO
among those who VXEVFULEHWRWKHP¶S7RVWDUWZLWKno basic ideas makes the task of 
assessing the extent of a shared tradition problematic if not impossible, however. Moreover, 
recognising that shared themes exist in the realist tradition does not equate to accepting an 
essentialist understanding of these concepts, which is one of the chief arguments that Haslam 
S PDNHV LQKLVPRQRJUDSK )ROORZLQJ2¶'ULVFROO¶V S  LQYRFDWLRQRI
/OR\G¶VEULGJHKHDGVRILQWHOOLJLELOLW\,XVH+DVODP¶VIRXUEHOLHIs not as essentialist ideas but 
DV D IRFDO SRLQW DURXQG ZKLFK WR HQDEOH WKH FRPSDULVRQ RI &DUU¶V thoughts in Britain and 
German-Soviet Relations and the realist tradition more broadly.  
The stretching out of hands across the ideological divide 
German-Soviet Relations was in effect a traditional diplomatic history. It was based on set of 
six lectures that Carr delivered as part of the Albert Shaw diplomatic history series in late 
1950 and early 1951 (Haslam, 2000, pp. 148±149). The initial spur for the lectures and 
VXEVHTXHQWPRQRJUDSKZDV&DUU¶VFRQWLQXLQJZRUNRQKLVKLVWRU\RIWKH6RYLHWUHYROXWLRQ,Q
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a letter to Isaac Deutscher Carr explained that the lectures and subsequent monograph were 
µ³DVRUWRIILUVWGUDIW´¶ +DVODPSIRUKLVKLVWRU\¶s third volume. The principal 
theme was the manner in which these two outcasts from Versailles managed, owing to 
international conditions and despite of ideological differences, to reach two geopolitically 
critical alliances during the course of the interrHJQXP&DUUWHUPHGLW WKHµVWUHWFKLQJ
RXWRIKDQGVDFURVVWKHLGHRORJLFDOEDUULHU¶SZKLFKREYLRXVO\ILWVUDWKHUVQXJJO\ZLWK
the idea of raison d'état. 
The context to the book is obviously evident. Haslam (2000) provides the most 
complete overview (pp. 149±154). Specifically, we are looking at the early Cold War and 
&DUU¶VKRSHGIRUPLGGOHJURXQG± or balance ± between the United States and Soviet Russia 
as well as his deference to Soviet Russia. The former runs through much of German-Soviet 
Relations VSHFLILFDOO\ WKH FKDSWHU RQ 6WUHVHPDQQ¶V GLSORPDWLF VNLOO ± what Carr (1951) 
UHIHUUHG WR DV KLV VNLOO IRU H[HUFLVLQJ µD JUHDW HFRQRP\ RI WUXWK¶ S  ± for balancing 
EHWZHHQHDVW DQGZHVW 7KHFRQQHFWLRQZLWK&DUU¶VRZQSURFOLYLWLHV LV REYLRXV. Moreover, 
German-Soviet Relations touches upon the pacification of the Soviet Union (at least in terms 
of foreign policy). Carr (1951) noted, as an example, the effects of the 1921 New Economic 
3ROLF\ZKLFKVWLPXODWHGµWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI³QRUPDOUHODWLRQV´EHWZHHQ6RYLHW5XVVLDDQG
the capitalist countries, and [relegated] international revolution to the background as an 
HOHPHQWRI6RYLHWGLSORPDF\¶S,QHIIHFWWKLVPHDQWWKDW6RYLHWSROLF\WRZDUG*HUPDQ\
was dictated more by raison d'état and less by revolutionary fervour, meaning that the failure 
of the aborted Moscow-backed Communist uprising in October 1923 was the last attempt at 
IRPHQWLQJVRFLDOLVPLQ*HUPDQ\µ1HYHUDJDLQZHUHWKHH[SHFWDWLRQVRIDQHDUO\UHYROXWLRQ
in Germany allowed to ovHUULGH WKH QRUPDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV RI IRUHLJQ SROLF\¶ ZURWH &DUU
µ1HYHUDJDLQZRXOG&RPLQWHUQSXUVXHDQLQGHSHQGHQWSROLF\RILWVRZQ¶S 
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It should be evident from the above that raison d'état ZDVFHQWUDOWR&DUU¶VGLSORPDWLF
history of German and Soviet relations between the wars. Balance of power, balance of trade 
and geopolitics were equally critical. Carr explained the Rapallo treaty in terms of relative 
SRZHUµ7KHWLPHZRXOGFRPHLQWKHQineteen-thirties when Germany could afford to abandon 
WKHSROLF\RIWKHEDODQFH¶ZURWH&DUUµDQGE\WKDWWLPH6RYLHW5XVVLDZDVDOVRVWURQJ
HQRXJKWRPDNHDFKRLFHEHWZHHQ*HUPDQ\DQGWKHZHVWHUQDOOLHV¶S7KHLPSOLFDWLRQ
in other words, was that the 1920s rapprochement was borne form relative power. However, 
it was not simply relative power that was influencing Russian and German diplomacy at this 
juncture. German-Soviet Relations also documented the economic structures which 
necessitated WKH VKLIWLQJ UHODWLRQVKLS 0DWWHUV RI WUDGH ZHUH FUXFLDO WR *HUPDQ\¶V UHFRYHU\
from the First World War (Carr, 1951, pp. 78±79). Moreover, the increasing centralization of 
*HUPDQ LQGXVWU\ FRXSOHG ZLWK *HUPDQ\¶V H[FOXVLRQ IURP WKH FDSLWDOLVW SRZHUV KHOSHG
facilitate the turn eastward in terms of market access (Carr, 1951, pp. 12±13). At the same 
WLPHWKHSDFLILFDWLRQRI6RYLHWUHYROXWLRQDU\DLPVLQWHUPVRI/HQLQ¶V1HZ(FRQRPLF3ROLF\
was, for Carr (1951, pp. 38±39), a product of economic interests and realities. His analysis in 
German-Soviet Relations equally centred in on geopolitics, particularly with regard to 
*HUPDQ\7DNHKLVGLVFXVVLRQRI WKH5DSDOOR WUHDW\DVDQH[DPSOH)RU&DUU  LW µSXW
Germany back into the position which geography had assigned to her of being able to 
manoeuvre on both her flanks, alternately seeking the support of the west against the easy and 
WKHHDVWDJDLQVWWKHZHVW¶S*HUPDQ\¶VJHRJUDSKLFSRVLWLRQLQRWKHUZRUGVPHDQWWKDW
the country was compelled to seek good relations with both, but especially its eastern 
neighbour. 
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Concerned not with ideology but with power politics 
BritainDFFRUGLQJWRWKHDXWKRU¶VSUHIDFHDLPHGWRSURYLGHDµFULWLFDOEXWQRWXQV\PSDWKHWLF
VXUYH\RI%ULWLVKIRUHLJQSROLF\¶&DUUS viii) between the wars. Although published in 
the same year as the first edition of 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV, Britain is radically different in 
terms of its gestation period. Whereas 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV was conceived of in 1937 
DQGGUHZIURPLGHDVGDWLQJEDFNWR&DUU¶VWLPHLQ6RYLHW5XVVLDand before (Wilson, 2004, p. 
185), Britain was completed in 1939 after Munich. Like German-Soviet Relations, however, 
the text was littered with phrases immediately appealing to realist ears. Focusing in on British 
national interests and the German question specifically, Carr again drew from raison d'état. 
Although recognising that partisan politics had significantly shaped British policy toward 
Soviet Russia since its UHYROXWLRQ KH QHYHUWKHOHVV REVHUYHG WKDW µVLQFH >@ SROLF\ KDV
SULPDULO\ EHHQ FRQFHUQHG QRW ZLWK LGHRORJLHV EXW ZLWK ZKDW DUH FRPPRQO\ FDOOHG ³SRZHU
SROLWLFV´¶± in effect the German question (Carr, 1939, p. 147). 
The context ± or what Carr (1964) wouOGKDYHFDOOHGWKHµEX]]LQJ¶S± is again 
HYLGHQW%ULWDLQ LV LQPDQ\ UHVSHFWV&DUU¶Vmea culpa as Cox notes (Carr, 2001, p. xxvii). 
+DYLQJ RXWOLQHG %ULWDLQ¶V (XURSHDQ VWUDWHJ\ DV HQVXULQJ WKH SUHYHQWLRQ RI D FRQWLQHQWDO
hegemon (Carr, 1939, p. 124&DUU¶VGHSLFWLRQRI*HUPDQ\LQWKHFORVLQJSDVVDJHVRIWH[W
QDPHO\DVWDWHLQWHQWRQµWKHEUXWDOGRPLQDWLRQ¶SRI(XURSHLVLQREYLRXVFRQWUDVWWR
7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV. In many respects, however, Carr used Britain to defend 
appeasement in terms of inter alia relative power and capabilities $V KH REVHUYHG µWKH
DUPDPHQWVLWXDWLRQPDGHDSROLF\RIFRQFLOLDWLRQWKHRQO\SUDFWLFDORQH¶&DUUS
7KH FRQWH[W LH WKH GHYHORSLQJ FRQIOLFW ZLWK 1D]L *HUPDQ\ DQG &DUU¶V RZQ LGHRORJLFDO
proclivities, also explain the étatist understanding democracy underpinning Britain (Jones, 
1998, p. 152), which again demonstrates the prevalence of raison d'état in Britain.  
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Geopolitics, relative power and balance of trade were also utilised by Carr in Britain. 
Britain, as already noted, focused on relative decline and the manner in which this 
FRQVWUDLQHG%ULWDLQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRDFWOLNHDKHJHPRQ&DUUSS±22). Moreover, Carr 
 DOVR ZURWH WKDW IRUHLJQ SROLF\ µLV DOZD\V GHSHQGHQW RQ WKH SRVVHssion of military 
strength, or rather, on the ratio EHWZHHQWKHPLOLWDU\VWUHQJWKRIRQH¶VRZQFRXQWU\DQGWKDWRI
RWKHUV¶S8QGHUSLQQLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLYHGHFOLQHDWWKLVMXQFWXUHZDVUHODWLYHHFRQRPLF
GHFOLQH &DUU  QRWHG WKDW WKH ORVV µRI economic power, whether absolute or relative, 
PHDQVORVVRISROLWLFDOSRZHU¶S,QWXUQ%ULWDLQ¶VFDSDFLW\IRULQWHUYHQWLRQEHFDPHOHVV
&DUU  S  0RUHRYHU UHODWLYH HFRQRPLF GHFOLQH DOVR H[SODLQHG %ULWDLQ¶V PRYH
toward a preventive, status quo orientated grand strategy (Carr, 1939, pp. 26±27). 
Additionally, Carr clearly believed that British policy was a product of its geographical 
location. Owing to its geographical position, Carr (1939, p. 34) contended that Britain was 
drawn into the European balance of power whenever circumstances necessitated it. In fact, he 
ZHQW DV IDU DV WR VXJJHVW WKDW%ULWDLQ¶V JHRJUDSKLFDO ORFDWLRQ µGHWHUPLQHV WKHQDWXUHRIKHU
[sic@(XURSHDQSROLF\¶&DUUS+HZDVQRWHQWLUHO\FRQVLVWHQWKHUHZLWKUegard to 
the geopolitical determinism, however. Earlier in the text, as an example, he concluded that 
%ULWDLQ¶VUROHDVDZRUOGDVRSSRVHGWRD(XURSHDQSRZHUZDVERUQHQRWIURPJHRJUDSK\EXW
IURP%ULWDLQ¶VVSHFLILFGHYHORSPHQWDVDQLQGXVWULDO-imperialist power (Carr, 1939, p. 35). 
Contemporary reconstruction: Britain, German-Soviet Relations and 
neoclassical realism 
The last point ± DVWUXFWXUHLHJHRJUDSK\FRQGLWLRQVEXWGRHVQRWGHWHUPLQHDVWDWH¶VSROLF\
or behaviour ± instinctively leads to the possibility of a conversation between Britain, 
German-Soviet Relations and neoclassical realism. &RQVLGHULQJ&DUU¶V ORVWZRUN LQ OLJKWRI 
neoclassical realism is apt because neoclassical realism KDVEHHQDUJXHGWREHµWKHRQO\JDPH
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in town for the next and the current generation RIUHDOLVWV¶ 6FKZHOOHUSS344±345). 
Given this, it is unsurprising that neoclassical realism is firmly established in the literature so 
only a cursory introduction is necessary here (e.g. Lobell et al, 2009; Toje and Kunz, 2012a). 
Neoclassical realism seeks to explain policy rather than international outcomes. It does so by 
drawing from both the parsimony and rigour of structural realism and the diplomatic insights 
drawn from classical realism (Taliaferro et al, 2009, p. 4). It is a contingent theory in that it 
DUJXHV WKDW WKH H[WHUQDO VWUXFWXUH LV FUXFLDOO\ LQIOXHQWLDO LQ VKDSLQJ D VWDWH¶V FRQGXFW <HW
internal dynamics (i.e. institutional capacities, the intellectual climate and bureaucratic and 
individual actors) are equally critical in terms of policy action and inaction. This is because 
they act as a transmission belt through which structural constraints and incentives are 
perceived, understood and acted upon (Rose, 1998, p. 158). This focus is logical. After all, 
µDQ\ VSHFLILF IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GHFLVLRQ«LV FRQWLQJHQW RQ GRPHVWLF DQG LQGLYLGXDO XQLW-level 
IDFWRUV¶/REHOOet al, 2015, p. 157). 
In order to assess the similarities and indeed points of departure between neoclassical 
realism and Britain and German-Soviet Relations it is necessary to render some core 
assumptions of neoclassical realism. First, neoclassical realists typically contend that the 
VWDWH¶V SULQFLSDO SULRULW\ LV VHFXULW\ LQ UHVponse to threat. As Dueck (2009) explains, 
QHRFODVVLFDOUHDOLVPµEegins by positing that state officials inevitably have some conception 
RIWKHQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWLQWKHIDFHRISRWHQWLDOH[WHUQDOWKUHDWV¶ (p. 146). Second, neoclassical 
UHDOLVPZRUNVZLWKDµ³WRS-GRZQ´FRQFHSWLRQRIWKH VWDWH¶7DOLDIHUURet al, 2009, p. 25). This 
means that the state ± RU PRUH DSSURSULDWHO\ WKH H[HFXWLYH FKDUJHG ZLWK PDNLQJ D VWDWH¶V
foreign policy ± is driven primarily by systemic incentives and constraints. Accordingly, the 
H[HFXWLYH µLV SRWHQWLDOO\ DXWRQRPRXV IURP VRFLHW\¶ 7DOLDIHUUR et al, 2009, p. 25). Despite 
this, however, the executive is constrained by the domestic political environment, and factors 
such as public opinion, societal interest groups and other bureaucratic actors create variation 
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in how states respond to external pressure (Ripsman, 2009, pp. 171±174). Third, neoclassical 
UHDOLVWVGUDZLQJ IURP5RVH¶V , p. 158) imperfect transmission belt analogy, highlight 
the importance of subjective perceptions. As Taliaferro and Wishart (2014) observe, leaders 
µGHILQH ³QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV´ EDVHG XSRQ WKHLU VXEMHFWLYH DVVHVVPHQWV RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
GLVWULEXWLRQRISRZHUDQGRWKHUVWDWHV¶ LQWHQWLRQV¶ (p. 48). Fourth, neoclassical realists posit 
that over the long-term the policies a state pursues will reflect structural constraints and 
incentives, namely the distribution of capabilities (Taliaferro et al, 2009, p. 4). This is 
EHFDXVH WKH µSRVLWLRQ RI WKH VWDWH LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO V\VWHP GHILQHV WKH ERXQGDULHV RI WKH
SRVVLEOHUDQJHRISROLFLHVLWFDQDGRSWLQWKHORQJWHUP¶'HYlen and Özdamar, 2009, p. 144). 
+RZHYHUQHRFODVVLFDO UHDOLVWVEHOLHYHµWKDW WKH OLQNEHWZHHQFDSDELOLWLHVDQG LQWHQWLRQV LVD
VWDUWLQJ SRLQW DQG QRW D ULJLG FDXVDO UHODWLRQVKLS¶ -XQHDX , p. 21). The international 
structure, in other words, conditions but does not determine state behaviour (Schweller, 1998, 
p. 3). 
These ideas are evident in both Britain and German-Soviet Relations. Take the first 
principal, as an example. In Britain, Carr (1939) FRQFOXGHG WKDW VHFXULW\ LV FKLHI µ7KH
SUXGHQW VWDWHVPHQ¶ he ZURWH µPXVW«QRW SXUVXH D SROLF\ ZKLFK LV OLNHO\ WR H[SRVH KLV
FRXQWU\WRZDUDJDLQVWHTXDORUVXSHULRURGGV¶S0RUeover, Carr (1951, pp. 134±136) 
H[SODLQHG6WDOLQ¶VFRQWURYHUVLDOQRQ-aggression pact with Nazi Germany on the basis of the 
primacy of security (if the Soviet Union could not rely on the Western nations to balance the 
threat, which is what Stalin believed at that juncture, then the non-aggression pact could 
purchase immunity frRP *HUPDQ\ &DUU¶V  SS ±30, 68±69; 1951, pp. 4±13) 
discussions of the British state, particularly its relationship to and independence from 
capitalist interests, and the German state, specifically its capacity to balance competing 
groups vying for an eastern and western outlook, reflect the second neoclassical realist 
principle outlined above. The importance of perception and misperception in terms of threat 
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DQGRWKHUV¶LQWHQWLRQVDUHDOVRHYLGHQWLQBritain and German-Soviet Relations (Carr, 1939, p. 
192; 1951, p. 114). )LQDOO\ LQ PDQ\ SODFHV &DUU¶V ORVW WH[WV LOOXVWUDWHG WKH LGHD WKDW WKH
external environment conditioned but did not determine behaviour. This is best evidenced in 
the agency he attributed to Hitler and William II in acting contra WR*HUPDQ\¶VJHRJUDSKLFDO
and historical traditions (Carr, 1951, p. 1). The same idea was also evident in the manner in 
which shared norms and culture meant that increasing American power was less threatening 
to Britain than increasing German power (Carr, 1939, pp. 43±44). 
If the analysis presented here is correct, then the Carr that wrote Britain and German-
Soviet Relations LV D VWRQH¶V WKURZ DZD\ IURP WKH OHDGLQJ UHDOLVW DSSURDFK LQ ,5 $W IDFH
value, this is hardly surprising as, inter alia, Carr is typically depicted as a leading figure that 
neoclassical realists wish to draw from (Taliaferro et al, 2009, p. 4). What is particularly 
puzzling, however, is that neoclassical realists (as realists tend to doJHQHUDOO\UHGXFH&DUU¶V
contribution to The Twent\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV. Unfortunately, as the revisionist literature has 
shown, DQGWKLVSDSHULVLQDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKLVWH[W¶VDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKUHDOLVPLVGXELRXVDW
best. As neoclassical realists increasingly turn toward the grand strategies of the great powers 
during the wars (Taliaferro et alWKHQHJOHFWRI&DUU¶VZULWLQJVLQWKLVDUHDLVSX]]OLQJ
LI QRW UHIOHFWLYH RI UHDOLVP¶V ZHDN KLVWRULFDO FRQVFLRXVQHVV $V D FRUUHFWLYH JUHDWHU
recognition should be given to Britain and German-Soviet Relations in the neoclassical canon 
instead of 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV. 3 
There are two reasons why this re-engagement could prove fruitful. First, situating 
&DUU¶VIRUJRWWHQWH[WVLQWKHQHRFODVVLFDOUHDOLVWFDQRQZRXOGexploit the difference between 
competing variants of neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism is increasingly in danger of 
becoming Waltzian neorealism plus. In fact, neoclassical realism has been argued to be a 
ORJLFDO H[WHQVLRQ RI QHRUHDOLVP EHFDXVH LW µYLQGLFDWH>V@ :DOW] >UDWKHU WKDQ@ XQGHUPLQ>LQg] 
KLP¶ 5DWKEXQ  S  7KLV LV EHFDXVH QHRFODVVLFDO UHDOLVWV W\SLFDOO\ UHGXFH WKH
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external environment to anarchy and the distribution of capabilities, much as neorealism does 
(Schmidt and Juneau, 2012, p. 69). This is why the moniker neo-neorealism as opposed to 
neoclassical realism is apt for a lot self-conscious neoclassical realist work (Toje and Kunz, 
2012b, p. 8 +RZHYHU WKH H[WHUQDO FRQVWUDLQWV DQG LQFHQWLYHV ZKLFK VKDSH D FRXQWU\¶V
IRUHLJQSROLF\GRQRWVWRSDWQHRUHDOLVP¶VHGJH%X]DQet al, 1993, pp. 29±33). The realism in 
Britain and German-Soviet Relations, which pointed to geography, history, relative power, 
ideological affinity, technology and international institutions as important conditioners of a 
VWDWH¶VGLSORPDWLFFRQGXFWoffers a more extensive understanding of the external pushes and 
SXOOV RQ D FRXQWU\¶V EHKDYLRXU 7KLV LV LPSRUWDQW EHFDXVH WKH HPHUJHQFH µRI D GLVWLQFWO\
(XURSHDQ UHDOLVW VFKRROZKLFKGUDZVRQ WKH URRWVRI WKHKLVWRULFDO(XURSHDQ WUDGLWLRQ¶KDV
recently been observed (Toje and Kunz, 2012b, p. 10). Unfortunately, only one of the 
chapters in this FROOHFWLRQ%DWWLVHOD¶VGLVFXVVLRQRI5D\PRQG$URQVHHPVH[SOLFLWO\
concerned with employing classical works and authors to exploit the difference between the 
(XURSHDQDQG1RUWK$PHULFDQYDULDQWVRIQHRFODVVLFDOUHDOLVP%HUHQVNRHWWHU¶VDQG4XLQQ¶V
(2012) chapter points to Carr, but makes the typical error RIUHGXFLQJ&DUU¶Vrealism to The 
7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV). The value-added worth of the recovery of some oI&DUU¶V IRUJRWWHQ
work rests in its capacity for acting as a base for broadening our understanding of 
neoclassical realism beyond neorealism. 
Second, and related, the turn to Britain and German-Soviet Relations could potentially 
overcome some of the tensiRQVLGHQWLILHGLQPDUU\LQJWKHSDUVLPRQ\RI:DOW]¶VGHWHUPLQDWLYH
structure with a more contingent and empirically richer approach to foreign policy analysis. 
4XLQQ  FRQWHQGV WKDW QHRFODVVLFDO UHDOLVP¶V IRFXV RQ DQ HYHU-expanding set of unit-
level vaULDEOHVSXWVQHRFODVVLFDOUHDOLVPRQDµFROOLVLRQFRXUVH¶(p. 164) with its intellectual 
baseline. His solution to this dilemma is to argue that, rather than being complementary to 
neorealism, QHRFODVVLFDOUHDOLVP¶VEROGHUDQGPRUHDXWKHQWLFFRQWULEXWLRQUests in its capacity 
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for offering a challenge to neorealism (that is, by showing where and how states have, over 
the long-term, eschewed system imperatives and escaped systemic punishment) (Quinn, 
2013, pp. 176±177). Although provocative, the fork-in-the-road identified ± neoclassical 
realism as either a complement to or a reaction against neorealism ± continues to reproduce a 
Waltzian-centric understanding of realism, which tends to overlook the pathological 
influence that Waltz had on realism (Wohlforth, <HVXWLOLVLQJ&DUU¶VFODVVLFDOZRUNV
on great power interwar diplomacy may produce more classical than neoclassical insights. 
However, this criticism only holds weight if one adopts a pejorative stance toward classical 
realism. If, on the other hand, one is more welcoming of a classical realist revival (Rynning 
and Ringsmose, 2008), then there is little to fear in turning to more traditional works. 
Conclusion 
Revisionist historiography has forced the discipline to reconsider many of its supposed 
foundational truths. E.H. Carr, arguably a pivotal thinker in the history of international 
political thought, has been caught up in this development. The revisionist turn has resulted in 
WKHTXHVWLRQLQJRI&DUU¶VDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKWKHUHDOLVWWUDGLWLRQ7\SLFDlly, realists, pointing to 
specific aspects of 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV, answer yes to the question of whether Carr was 
D UHDOLVW 'UDZLQJ IURP &DUU¶V WKRXJKW PRUH ZLGHO\ UHYLVLRQLVWV KDYH FKDOOHQJHG WKLV
depiction and, in turn, offered a more nuanced and ultimately sophisticated understanding of 
Carr. 
In terms of 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV there is little inaccurate with the revisionist 
literature. In fact, recovering Britain and German-Soviet Relations ± as was done above ± 
further bolsters the revisionist case that 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV has been poorly understood 
in some quarters. At the same time, however, Britain and German-Soviet Relations serve to 
KLJKOLJKW WKH LQFRPSOHWHQHVV RI WKH UHYLVLRQLVW OLWHUDWXUH 3RLQWLQJ WR &DUU¶V more overt 
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imbibing of the realist tradition in these texts suggests that the revisionists have overlooked a 
more hard-nosed realism ± a realism that did not appear as naked as say in 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶
Crisis for example. Where does that leave our understanding of Carr? Given that the 
progressive aspects (the what could or even should be) of say 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV, 
Conditions of Peace, Nationalism and After and What is History jar with the historical-
empirical work (the what was) of Britain and German-Soviet Relations, is Carr, to borrow 
IURP+XPSKUH\V¶ZRUNRQ:DOW]DµWKHRULVWGLYLGHGDJDLQVWKLPVHOI¶S"This 
KLQJHV RQ ZKHWKHU ZH H[SHFW D VFKRODU¶V ZRUN WR UHPDLQ FRQVLVWHQW RYHU WLPH For Carr 
(1964) WKLVZDVQRW WKHFDVHDV WKHµKLVWRULDQKLPVHOI LV LQIOX[¶ just like not being able to 
step into the same river twice, WZR H[DFW VDPH µERRNV FDQQRW EH ZULWWHQ E\ WKH VDPH
KLVWRULDQ¶S  
This exercise has more relevance than simply refining our undHUVWDQGLQJ RI &DUU¶V
contribution to IR theory. Indeed, the analysis presented above suggests close parallels 
between Britain, German-Soviet Relations and neoclassical realism. Some might say that this 
is hardly surprising; after all, Carr is one of the many classical authors that neoclassical 
realists seek to draw influence from. However, typically (if not rather puzzlingly) they only 
refer to 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV, which is at best loosely connected to the realist tradition. A 
more fruitful starting point for thinking about Carr and neoclassical realism rests in Britain 
and German-Soviet Relations. At the very least, the more in-depth understanding of the 
SXVKHV DQG SXOOV RQ D FRXQWU\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GHYHORSHG LQ WKHVH WH[WV ZRXOG VHUYH DV D
useful tool for those seeking to carve out a distinctly European variant of realist foreign 
policy analysis.   
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Notes 
1 Generally speaking, the revisionist literature has tended to focus on these three texts along with The 
7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV. There are always exceptions to rules. Although providing a limited account of 
Britain, Haslam (2002, p. 149) notes that in German-Soviet Relations µ&DUU WKH UHDOLVW ZDV LQ WKH
DVFHQGDQW¶-RQHVFKDSWHULQFRQWUDVWPDNHVOHVVXVHRIGerman-Soviet Relations (although 
he does use a quotation from it to subtitle his monograph) and more of Britain in terms of building the 
case for Carr as a pragmatic realist. Molloy (2013) also draws from Britain in order to illuminate upon 
&DUU¶V DGYRFDF\ RI DSSHDVHPHQW 7KLV SDSHU ZKLOH LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKHVH ZRUNV GHYHORSV WKH FDVH
further by situating Britain and German-Soviet Relations alongside contemporary developments in the 
realist tradition, i.e. neoclassical realism. 
2 Raison d'état UHIHUVWRWKDWµWKHEHOLHIWKDWZKHUHLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVDUHFRQFHUQHGWKHLQWHUHVWVRI
WKHVWDWHSUHGRPLQDWHRYHUDOORWKHULQWHUHVWVDQGYDOXHV¶+DVODPS7). Although the balance 
of trade may be the most problematic category in +DVODP¶V WRXU G¶KRUL]RQ, given that it may be 
awkward to think of the many political economists he refers to as belonging to one tradition, at its 
minimum it refers to the principle WKDWµZHDOWK>LV@WKHSUHFRQGLWLRQRISRZHU¶+DVODPS
*HRSROLWLFVLQFRQWUDVWHPSKDVLVHVWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKDVWDWH¶VJHRJUDSKLFSRVLWLRQFRQVWUDLQWVDQG
LQFHQWLYLVHVLWVEHKDYLRXU+DVODPS+DVODP¶VSS±91) definition of the balance 
of power broadly follows Hume, i.e. natural equilibrium. This understanding of the balance of power 
has been called into question empirically (Kaufman et al, 2007). I, therefore, utilise the balance of 
power in terms of viewing it as a state of affairs which necessarily influences state behaviour. I draw 
IURP :RKOIRUWK¶V  REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW UHDOLVWV YLHZ VWDWH EHKDYLRXU DV DQ µDGDSWLRQ WR H[WHUQDO
FRQVWUDLQWVFRQGLWLRQHGE\FKDQJHVLQUHODWLYHSRZHU¶S 
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3 It should be noted that there are epistemological differences between Britain, German-Soviet Relations 
and neoclassical realism. Whilst the latter tended toward a traditionalist history, contemporary 
neoclassical realists lean toward a history without historicism where history is utilised to verify, refine 
DQG UHIXWH WKHRUHWLFDO DQG K\SRWKHWLFDO SURSRVLWLRQV )RU WKLV DUJXPHQW ZLWK UHJDUG WR &DUU¶V ODWHU
diplomatic histories of the Soviet Union and their relationship to realism see Smith (forthcoming). 
References  
Ashworth, L. (2014) A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern 
State to Academic International Relations. London: Routledge. 
Babík, M. (2013) Realism as critical theory: The international thought of E.H. Carr. 
International Studies Review 15(4): 491±514. 
Battisela, D. (2012) Raymond Aron: A neoclassical realist before the term existed. In: A. 
Toje and B. Kunz (eds.) Neoclassical Realism in European Politics. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, pp. 117±132. 
Behr, H. and Molloy, S. (2013) Realism reconsidered: New contexts and critiques. 
International Politics 50(6): 736±738. 
Bell, D.S.A. (2001) International relations: The dawn of a historiographical turn. British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 3(1): 115±126. 
Bell, D.S.A. (2009) (ed.) Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a 
Realist Theme. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Berenskoetter, F. and Quinn, A. (2012) Hegemony by invitation: Neoclassical realism, soft 
power and US-European relations. In: A. Toje and B. Kunz (eds.) Neoclassical 
Realism in European Politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 214±
233. 
Booth, K. (1991) Security in anarchy: Utopian realism in theory and practice. International 
Affairs 67(3): 527±545. 
21 
 
Buzan, B., Jones, C. and Little, R. (1993) The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural 
Realism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Carr, E.H. (1936) Public opinion as a safeguard of peace. International Affairs 15(6): 846±
862. 
Carr, E.H. (1939) Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the 
Outbreak of War. London: Longmans Green. 
Carr, E.H. (1946[1939]) 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV±1939: An Introduction to the Study 
of International Relations. 2nd edition. New York: Harper & Row.  
Carr, E.H. (1951) German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919±1939. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.  
Carr, E.H. (1964[1961) What is History? London: Penguin. 
Carr, E.H. (2001[1939]) 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV±1939: An Introduction to the Study 
of International Relations. Edited by M. Cox. London: Macmillan. 
Cox, M. (1999) Will the real E.H. Carr please stand up? International Affairs 75(3): 643±653. 
Cox, M. (ed.) (2004) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cox, M. (2010) E.H. Carr and the crisis of twentieth-century liberalism. Millennium ± 
Journal of International Studies 38(3): 523±533. 
Cox, M. (2012) Foreword. In: B. Schmidt (ed.) International Relations and the First Great 
Debate. London: Routledge, pp. xii±xiv. 
Devlen, B. and Özdamar, Ö. (2009) Neoclassical realism and foreign policy crises. In: A. 
Freyberg-Inan, E. Harrison and P. James (eds.) Rethinking Realism in International 
Relations. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, pp. 136±163.  
Dueck, C. (2009) Neoclassical realism and the national interest: Presidents, domestic politics, 
and major military interventions. In: S.E. Lobell et al (eds.) Neoclassical Realism, the 
State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 139±170. 
22 
 
Dunne, T., Cox, M. and Booth, K. (eds.) (1998) 7KH (LJKW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Relations, 1919±1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Evans, G. (1975) E.H. Carr and International Relations. British Journal of International 
Studies 1(1): 77±97. 
Fox, W.T.R. (1985) E.H. Carr and political realism: Vision and revision. Review of 
International Studies 11(1): 1±16. 
Hall, I. and Bevir, M. (2014) Traditions of British international thought. The International 
History Review 36(5): 823±834. 
Haslam, J. (2000) The Vices of Integrity: E.H. Carr, 1892±1982. London: Verso. 
Haslam, J. (2002) No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since 
Machiavelli. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Howe, P. (1994) The utopian realism of E.H. Carr. Review of International Studies 20(3): 
277±297. 
+XPSKUH\V $5&  µ:DOW] DQG WKH ZRUOG 1HRUHDOLVP DV LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFDO
theory. International Politics 50(6): 863±879. 
Ikenberry, G.J. (2008) The rise of China and the future of the west: Can the liberal system 
survive. Foreign Affairs 87(1): 23±37. 
Johnston, W. (1967) (+ &DUU¶V Wheory of International Relations. The Journal of Politics 
29(4): 861±884. 
Jones, C. (1998) E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Juneau, T. (2015) Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign 
Policy. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Kaufman, S.J., Little, R. and Wohlforth, W.C. (2007) The Balance of Power in World 
History. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
23 
 
Kostagiannis, K. (2013) Mind the gap between nationalism and International Relations: 
Power and the nation-state in E.H. &DUU¶VUHDOLVP International Politics 50(6): 830±
845. 
Linklater, A. (1997) The transformation of political community: E.H. Carr, critical theory and 
International Relations. Review of International Studies 23(3): 321±338. 
Lobell, S.E., Ripsman, N.M. and Taliaferro, J.W. (eds.) (2009) Neoclassical Realism, the 
State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lobell, S.E., Jesse, N.G. and Williams, K.P. (2015) Why do secondary states choose to 
support, follow or challenge? International Politics 52(2): 146±162. 
Mearsheimer, J.J. (2005) E.H. Carr vs idealism: The battle rages on. International Relations 
19(2): 139±152. 
Mearsheimer, J.J. (2010) The gathering sWRUP&KLQD¶Vchallenge to US power in Asia. The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics 3(4): 381±396. 
Molloy, S. (2013) Spinoza, Carr, and the ethics of 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV. Review of 
International Studies 39(2): 251±271. 
Nishimura, K. (2011) E.H. Carr, Dostoevsky, and the problem of irrationality in modern 
Europe. International Relations 25(1): 45±64. 
2¶'ULVFROO& 5HZULWLQJ WKH MXVWZDU WUDGLWLRQ-XVWZDU LQFODVVLFDO*UHHNSROLWLFDO
thought and practice. International Studies Quarterly 59(1): 1±10. 
Quinn, A. (2013) Kenneth Waltz, Adam Smith and the limits of science: Hard choices for 
neoclassical realism. International Politics 50(2): 159±182. 
Rathbun, B. (2009) A rose by any other name: Neoclassical realism as the logical and 
necessary extension of structural realism. Security Studies 17(2): 294±321.  
24 
 
RipsPDQ10µ1HRFODVVLFDOUealism and domestic interest groups. In: S.E. Lobell et 
al (eds.) Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 170±193. 
Rose, G. (1998) Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics 51(1): 
144±172. 
Rynning, S. and Ringsmose, J. (2008) Why Are revisionist states revisionist? Reviving 
classical realism as an approach to understanding international change. International 
Politics 45(1): 19±39. 
Schmidt, B. (ed.) (2012) International Relations and the First Great Debate. London: 
Routledge.  
Schmidt, B. and Juneau, T. (2012) Neoclassical realism and power. In: A. Toje and B. Kunz 
(eds.) Neoclassical Realism in European Politics. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, pp. 61±78. 
Schweller, R.L. (1998) 'HDGO\ ,PEDODQFHV 7ULSRODULW\ DQG +LWOHU¶V 6WUDWHJ\ RI :RUOG
Conquest. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Schweller, R. L. (2003) The progressiveness of neoclassical realism. In: C. Elman and M. 
Elman (eds.) Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 311±348. 
Smith, K. (2016) The UHDOLVPWKDWGLGQRWVSHDNLWVQDPH(+&DUU¶VGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHVRI
WKHWZHQW\\HDUV¶FULVLVReview of International Studies forthcoming.  
Steele, B. (2013) Context and appropriation: The risks, benefits and challenges of 
reinterpretive expression. International Politics 50(6): 739±752. 
Sterling-Folker, J. (2009) Forward is as forward does: Assessing neoclassical realism from a 
traditions perspective. In: A. Freyberg-Inan, E. Harrison and P. James (eds.) 
25 
 
Rethinking Realism in International Relations. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, pp. 
191±218. 
Taliaferro, J.W., Lobell, S.E. and Ripsman, N.M. (2009) Introduction: neoclassical realism, 
the state, and foreign policy. In: Lobell, S.E. et al (eds.) Neoclassical Realism, the 
State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1±41. 
Taliaferro, J.W., Ripsman, N.M. and Lobell, S.E. (eds.) (2012) The Challenge of Grand 
Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance between the World Wars. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Taliaferro, J.W. and Wishart, R.W. (2014) Neoclassical realism: Domestic opportunities for 
great power intervention. In: J. Sterling-Folker (ed.) Making Sense of International 
Relations Theory. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, pp. 47±66. 
Thompson, K.W. (1980) Masters of International Thought. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press. 
Toje, A. and Kunz, B. (eds.) (2012a) Neoclassical Realism in European Politics. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press.  
Toje, A. and Kunz, B. (2012b) Introduction: Neoclassical realism in Europe. In: A. Toje and 
B. Kunz (eds.) Neoclassical Realism in European Politics. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, pp. 1±16. 
Walt, S.M. (1997) The progressive power of realism. American Political Science Review 
91(4): 931±935. 
Williams, M.C. (ed.) (2007) Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in 
International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, P. (2001) Radicalism for a conservative purpose: The peculiar realism of E.H. Carr. 
Millennium ± Journal of International Studies 30(1): 123±136. 
26 
 
Wilson, P. (2004) Carr and his early critics: Responses to 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV, 1939±
1946. In: M. Cox (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
pp. 165±197. 
:LOVRQ 3  µ:KHUH are we now in the debate about the first great debate. In: B. 
Schmidt (ed.) International Relations and the First Great Debate. London: 
Routledge, pp. 133±151. 
Wohlforth, W.C. (1994) Realism and the end of the cold war. International Security 19(3): 
91±129. 
Wohlforth, W.C. (2011) Gilpinian realism and International Relations. International 
Relations 25(4): 499±511. 
 
